

**The social axioms of populism:
Investigating the relationship of culture and populist attitudes:**

Supplementary Materials

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Study 2

Expanded discussion of dependent variables in Study 2

This inventory contained two items that directly pertained to populist attitudes: “The people running this country don't really care what happens to people like me,” and “I support the rights and power of the people in their struggle against the privileged elite.”^{1,2} We treated the first item as tapping anti-elitism, as it focused on the tension between the elite and ordinary people, which is similar items of Schulz et al.’s scale (2018; e.g., “People like me have no influence on whatever the government does.”). The second item pertains to sovereignty of the people as it emphasized the struggle of the people for self-determination the concept of popular sovereignty; it is again similar to items on the pertinent dimension of Schulz et al.’s scale (2018; e.g., “The people should have a final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendum.”). No doubt this second item also included the notion of anti-elitism, though the comparatively low correlation between these items illustrated that they are relatively distinct (see Table 3). We also selected a third item on institutional trust (“I can always trust the government to do what is right”) which can be considered as a measure of anti-elitism (Geurkink et al., 2020) which is also the common facet among populism scales (Castanho Silva et al., 2020).³ We include the institutional trust item as mapping an attitude that is typical of populist, though not diagnostic if it.

¹This data set did not include any item that tapped the homogeneity of the people.

²In Saucier’s (2013) work, the first item was part of his gamma scale, which tapped communal rationalism. Saucier characterized this construct as emphasizing “emphasis on common institutions and the exercise of reason as a source of value and goodness.” The second item was part of Saucier’s epsilon scale, which measured inequality aversion.

³In Saucier (2013), this institutional trust item was part of his gamma scale.

Table S1.
Basic Demographics of each country (Study 2).

Country	Retained from original sample	Sample Size	Age <i>M(SD)</i>	%Female
Argentina	54.48%	142	24.61(6.88)	58.57
Australia	49.25%	33	20.03(2.97)	63.63
Bangladesh	66.54%	181	21.73(2.19)	29.08
Brazil	71.79%	140	21.86(5.02)	78.57
Canada	70.00%	154	21.71(5.66)	62.99
China	58.86%	199	20.79(1.25)	75.88
Egypt.	76.32%	29	21.55(7.20)	34.45
England	85.56%	196	22.39(6.98)	62.76
Ethiopia	54.86%	209	23.88(3.98)	26.32
Germany	79.94%	279	23.35(6.27)	51.61
Greece	74.48%	184	21.85(5.02)	70.65
India	61.79%	241	21.05(4.20)	58.92
Ireland	60.60%	20	32.15(9.39)	65.00
Japan	71.33%	306	21.01(6.00)	61.76
Kenya	73.61%	212	24.43(4.95)	33.96
Korea	74.14%	43	25.93(8.86)	41.86
Malaysia	60.19%	195	20.51(0.94)	66.15
Mexico	57.96%	91	27.11(10.46)	64.84
Morocco	59.86%	264	25.29(8.67)	50.38
Nepal	73.41%	254	21.19(2.96)	56.69
Netherlands	76.66%	23	24.48(8.92)	56.52
Peru	57.93%	179	21.80(6.40)	58.10
Philippines	64.94%	276	19.95(2.72)	68.84
Poland	70.22%	158	21.15(2.79)	87.97
Russia	78.26%	54	20.39(4.75)	81.48
Singapore	72.04%	219	21.61(1.53)	56.16
Spain	65.70%	249	22.76(5.13)	63.45
Taiwan	69.11%	273	22.41(5.15)	65.93
Tanzania	68.36%	175	24.93(4.89)	33.14
Thailand	64.29%	225	21.54(5.64)	69.78
Turkey	59.62%	248	20.97(3.06)	54.84
Ukraine	75.41%	184	20.28(3.94)	62.50
USA	47.53%	202	21.50(5.85)	57.92

Table S2.*Social class background of respondents and economic metrics per country (Study 2).*

Country	Father ED <i>M(SD)</i>	Mother ED <i>M(SD)</i>	GDP Coefficient.	Gini Coefficient.
Argentina	4.67(2.70)	4.92(2.66)	10940.60	39.3
Australia	7.27(2.28)	6.39(2.41)	60642.24	32.3
Bangladesh	3.67(1.31)	2.90(1.47)	735.00	35.2
Brazil	4.71(2.68)	4.67(2.69)	12593.89	45.9
Canada	5.67(2.43)	5.57(2.32)	50345.43	30.8
China	3.43(1.92)	3.02(1.86)	5444.79	42.7
Egypt.	6.24(2.29)	5.79(2.40)	2780.95	43.3
England	5.69(2.59)	5.22(2.44)	38817.84	33.1
Ethiopia	4.33(2.93)	3.64(2.62)	374.21	34.0
Germany	5.67(2.24)	5.12(2.07)	43689.35	28.5
Greece	4.72(2.61)	4.59(2.36)	26427.24	33.3
India	7.23(1.99)	6.09(2.65)	1488.25	47.4
Ireland	3.75(2.34)	3.20(1.91)	48423.22	30.0
Japan	5.47(2.29)	4.50(1.76)	45902.67	32.3
Kenya	4.32(2.34)	3.53(2.15)	808.00	46.4
Korea	5.93(2.73)	4.98(2.45)	22424.06	31.2
Malaysia	4.27(2.75)	3.81(2.43)	9656.25	41.1
Mexico	3.41(2.49)	3.09(2.15)	10064.31	45.5
Morocco	4.71(3.07)	4.39(3.33)	3053.42	40.8
Nepal	6.17(2.73)	4.09(2.60)	619.45	38.4
Netherlands	5.57(2.37)	5.35(2.37)	50087.26	26.0
Peru	5.99(2.60)	4.78(2.42)	6008.95	45.5
Philippines	6.26(2.16)	6.18(2.03)	2369.52	40.3
Poland	6.15(2.62)	6.73(2.47)	13462.85	30.6
Russia	7.11(2.34)	7.22(2.14)	13089.34	35.5
Singapore	5.12(2.59)	4.84(2.46)	46241.02	39.3
Spain	3.84(2.59)	3.39(2.40)	32244.18	33.4
Taiwan	4.86(2.17)	4.27(1.83)	20082.92	30.5
Tanzania	3.53(2.63)	2.80(2.38)	528.56	43.9
Thailand	5.02(2.68)	4.82(2.73)	4972.04	40.9
Turkey	5.48(2.57)	4.40(2.49)	10498.34	40.3
Ukraine	6.85(2.17)	6.80(2.07)	3615.38	27.2
USA	6.19(2.26)	6.00(2.01)	48441.56	37.5

Note: GDP refers to the General Domestic Product per capita; figures were acquired from the World Bank (2020); Gini was obtained from Solt (2016); Other data are from Saucier et al. (2015).

Table S3

Multilevel modeling of populist attitudes (group-mean centered predictors) (Study 2)

Multilevel Modeling of Populist Attitudes (Grand-Mean Centered) from Study 2

	Sovereignty of the people				Anti-Elitism				Mistrust of Government			
	<i>b</i>	(se)	β	[95% CI]	<i>b</i>	(se)	β	[95% CI]	<i>b</i>	(se)	β	[95% CI]
Intercept	4.51***	(0.06)			4.23***	(0.09)			4.19***	(0.10)		
<u>Individual Level</u>												
Cynicism	0.09	(0.02)	.06***	[.03, .09]	0.28	(0.03)	.16***	[.13, .19]	0.11	(0.02)	.07***	[.04, .09]
Reward App.	0.02	(0.04)	.01	[-.03, .06]	-0.07	(0.02)	-.04*	[-.08, .00]	-0.16	(0.03)	-.09**	[-.12, -.05]
Religiosity	0.01	(0.02)	.01	[-.02, .03]	-0.08	(0.02)	-.06***	[-.08, -.03]	-0.04	(0.02)	-.03**	[-.05, -.01]
Social Flexibility	0.25	(0.02)	.18***	[.15, .23]	0.12	(0.05)	.05*	[.01, .09]	0.18	(0.03)	.11***	[.08, .15]
Fate Control	-0.04	(0.02)	-.02	[-.05, .01]	0.03	(0.03)	.02	[-.02, .05]	-0.26	(0.03)	-.14***	[-.16, -.10]
<u>County Level</u>												
Societal Cynicism	-0.01	(0.06)	-.02	[-.08, .08]	0.21	(0.09)	.14*	[.01, .26]	-0.11	(0.10)	-.08	[-.20, .05]
Dynamic Externality	0.13	(0.07)	.10	[.00, .20]	-0.19	(0.08)	.12*	[-.23, -.02]	-0.38	(0.10)	-.25**	[-.38, -.12]
<u>Cross-Level</u>												
<u>Societal Cynicism</u>												
(SCY)												
SCY*Cynicism	<0.01	(0.02)	<.01	[-.03, .03]	-0.02	(0.02)	-.01	[-.05, .03]	-0.04	(0.02)	-.02	[-.05, .01]
SCY*Reward App.	<0.01	(0.03)	<.01	[-.04, .05]	0.01	(0.03)	.01	[-.03, .05]	<-0.01	(0.03)	<.01	[-.02, .05]
SCY*Soc. Flex.	<0.01	(0.04)	<.01	[-.04, .04]	0.08	(0.05)	.03	[-.01, .08]	0.04	(0.04)	.02	[-.03, .03]
SCY*Fate Control	0.01	(0.02)	.01	[-.02, .04]	-0.04	(0.03)	-.02	[-.06, .02]	-0.03	(0.03)	-.02	[-.05, .00]
<u>Controls</u>												
Gender (Male = 0)	-0.05	(0.03)	-.04	[-.09, .01]	-0.12	(0.04)	-.08**	[-.13, -.03]	0.19	(0.04)	.12***	[.08, .17]
Age	-0.02	(0.02)	-.02	[-.04, .01]	-0.02	(0.02)	.01	[-.01, .04]	-0.03	(0.02)	-.02	[-.04, .01]
Father Ed.	-0.01	(0.02)	-.01	[-.04, .02]	-0.03	(0.02)	-.02	[-.05, .01]	0.04	(0.02)	.03*	[.00, .06]
Mother Ed.	-0.06	(0.02)	-.04**	[-.07, -.01]	0.02	(0.02)	.01	[-.02, .04]	0.05	(0.02)	.03*	[.00, .06]
GDP per cap.	-0.04	(0.07)	-.04	[-.13, .07]	-0.19	(0.09)	-.12	[-.24, -.01]	-0.25	(0.11)	-.17*	[-.30, -.03]
Inequality	0.03	(0.06)	.02	[-.06, .11]	-0.03	(0.07)	-.02	[-.11, .08]	-0.18	(0.09)	-.12*	[-.23, -.00]
<u>Variance components</u>												
Intercept (between)			0.08				0.26				0.28	
Social Cynicism			<0.01				0.01				<0.01	
Reward for			0.02				0.02				0.01	
Application												
Social Flexibility			0.01				0.02				0.02	
Fate Control			<0.01				0.02				0.01	
Residual			1.52				1.83				1.66	
<u>Model Fit</u>												
-2LL			19201.25				20293.03				19739.23	

AIC	19428.10	20519.87	19966.07
BIC	19133.25	20225.03	19671.13
Marginal R ²	0.07	0.07	0.11
Conditional R ²	0.13	0.20	0.24

⁺ $p < .10$, * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.
Note: $N = 5,837$.

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