

## **Perspective-Specific Moral Foundations Sensitivity and Political Orientation**

### **Abstract**

This project aims to systematically integrate two different representations of people's dispositions to think and feel about justice and morality-related issues thus far reflected in two independent constructs: Justice Sensitivity (JS) differentiates between different perspectives that people take when reflecting upon issues of (in-)justice, whereas Moral Foundations (MF) differentiate between different content domains of morality. Both perspective-specific JS as well as content-specific MF are related to political ideologies and behavioral inclinations, such as voting behavior, but the question of whether a perspective-specific approach, a content-specific approach, or an integrative approach best predicts political attitudes has remained unexplored so far. This is surprising because an integrative approach seems particularly promising and can contribute to current debates in moral psychology, social justice research, and political psychology. Here, we pre-register a cross-sectional online study ( $N=2200$ ) aimed at testing a measurement model based on items that combine four (JS) perspectives with five (MF) content domains – the Moral Perspectives and Foundations Scale (MPFS). We predict that (1) this measurement model describes the dimensional structure of the 120-item MPFS better than either a four-factorial perspectives model or a five-factorial content domain model. We also predict that (2a) a self-oriented moral foundations sensitivity positively predicts right-wing political orientation, preferences for populist right-wing parties, and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations, and that (2b) an other-oriented moral foundations sensitivity positively predicts left-wing political orientation and negatively predicts preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations.

## **Introduction**

Political ideology – people’s preferences for political parties, their self-reported location on a left-right (or liberal-conservative) dimension, or their specific opinions about political issues – is systematically related to people’s generalized views about morality (Bierbauer & Klinger, 2002; Milesi, 2016; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). For instance, liberals tend to view perceived injustices in the world (e.g., the economic divide between “first-world” and “third-world” countries) as more outraging than conservatives (Napier & Jost, 2008). Based on these and other findings, researchers have looked at how morality-related personality dispositions predict political ideology. Specifically, two constructs that reflect how people think and feel about justice and other morality-related issues have been shown to be meaningfully related to political ideology, Justice Sensitivity and Moral Foundations (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Rothmund, Bromme, Azevedo, 2020).

### **Justice Sensitivity (JS)**

Justice Sensitivity (JS) focuses on individual differences in how people perceive and react to experienced or observed injustice (Dar & Resh, 2001; Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987; Lovas & Wolt, 2002; Montada, Dalbert, & Schmitt, 1996; van den Bos, Maas, Waldring, & Semin, 2003). It reflects individuals’ stable dispositions to react to injustice across time and situations (Schmitt, 1996; Schmitt, Gollwitzer, Maes, & Arbach, 2005; Schmitt, Baumert, Gollwitzer, & Maes, 2010), and it reliably predicts behavioral reactions to perceived unfairness in organizational contexts (Schmitt & Dörfel, 1999), in real-life solidarity-related contexts (Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005), or in laboratory contexts (e.g., Mohiyeddini & Schmitt, 1997).

Based on the notion that episodes of injustice typically involve multiple perspectives (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990), that is, that injustice can be experienced from a victim’s, an observer’s, or a beneficiary’s perspective, Schmitt et al. (2005) developed three reliable scales for measuring victim sensitivity, observer sensitivity, and beneficiary sensitivity. Later,

Schmitt et al. (2010) added a fourth perspective, the perpetrator perspective, reflecting a person's active contribution to injustice (vs. the inadvertent experience of benefiting from injustice). Interestingly, intercorrelations between the observer, beneficiary, and perpetrator JS scales are quite high, whereas these scales are only moderately correlated with the victim sensitivity scale (Baumert, Beierlein et al., 2014; Schmitt et al., 2005, 2010). Schmitt et al. (2010) therefore reasoned that victim sensitivity reflects a sense of "justice for the self", whereas observer, beneficiary and perpetrator sensitivity reflect a sensitivity to different forms of "other-related" injustices (for a review, see Baumert & Schmitt, 2016; for a review specifically on the victim perspective of JS, see Gollwitzer, Rothmund, and Süssenbach, 2013). Notably, all items constructed to measure perspective-specific JS refer to rather generic forms of injustice (e.g., someone receives something that someone else would deserve, someone is undeservingly better off than someone else, someone is treated better than someone else). JS does not, however, differentiate explicitly between different moral content domains.

### **Moral Foundations (MF)**

Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Haidt & Joseph, 2004) identifies five domain-specific, yet interdependent, moral foundations, defined by moral concerns relating to (1) care/harm (2) fairness/cheating (3) loyalty/betrayal (4) authority/subversion and (5) sanctity/degradation (Haidt & Graham, 2007; see also Graham et al., 2011, 2013; Haidt, 2012, 2013). The care/harm foundation refers to concerns about caring, nurturing, and protecting vulnerable people from harm; the fairness/cheating foundation describes concerns for and emotional reactions towards inequalities in mutual exchanges; the loyalty/ingroup foundation relates to a concern for recognizing, trusting, and cooperating with members of one's in-group; the authority/subversion foundation includes emotional reactions and a concern for hierarchies and authorities; and the sanctity/degradation foundation incorporates

reactions to physical and meta-physical things that are either perceived as disgusting and impure or as elevated and sanctified (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt & Graham, 2007).

The five moral foundations can be classified into two higher-order categories (Graham et al., 2009): The first two foundations, including care/harm and fairness/cheating are usually referred to as the “individualizing foundations” as they are primarily concerned with protecting the rights and freedoms of individual people. The last three foundations, including loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation are described as the “binding foundations” because they are focused on preserving the group as a whole (see Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009).

### **The Integration of (Moral Foundation) Content Domains and (Justice Sensitivity) Perspectives**

Despite the fact that Moral Foundations Theory has inspired a great deal of research in moral/political psychology and social justice research, some aspects of the theory have faced various criticisms. For instance, the “dyadic morality” approach (Schein & Gray, 2015) rejects the domain-specific nature of MFT and argues that moral judgments boil down to a simple dyadic (“moral agent” vs. “moral patient”) cognitive template and that considerations of harm being done lie at the heart of all moral foundations.

The idea that how people reflect upon moral issues varies systematically as a function of the perspective from which they reflect upon them (i.e., victim, observer, beneficiary, perpetrator) seems plausible, and research on justice sensitivity proves that perspective-specific judgments regarding moral issues are meaningful (e.g., Gollwitzer, Schmitt, Schalke, Maes, & Baer, 2005). Research on moral foundations, however, does not discuss perspectives explicitly. From a theoretical point of view, Moral Foundations Theory assumes that judgments related to moral foundations are not influenced by the perspective of an individual. Moral Foundations Theory inherits this view from one of its building blocks, the social intuitionist model of moral judgement, where the authors essentially posit that moral

intuitions would be triggered by violations of moral domains from all perspectives alike

(Haidt & Joseph, 2004):

It seems that in all human cultures, individuals often react with flashes of feeling linked to moral intuitions when they perceive certain events in their social worlds: when they see others (particularly young others) suffering, and others causing that suffering; when they see others cheat or fail to repay favors; and when they see others who are disrespectful or who do not behave in a manner befitting their status in the group. With chimpanzees, these reactions occur mostly in the individual that is directly harmed. The hallmark of human morality is third-party concern: person A can get angry at person B for what she did to person C. (p. 58)

From a methodological point of view, the neglect of perspectives becomes apparent in the fact that the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ, Graham et al., 2009; Graham et al., 2011) and the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale (MFSS; Graham & Haidt, 2012), two scales developed to measure how much individuals endorse specific moral foundations, reflect moral concerns from different perspectives, without taking the issue of perspectives into account explicitly. The MFQ consists of two sub-scales, one of which implies an observer perspective (relevance sub-scale, Graham, 2011), whereas the other one implies multiple perspectives (judgment sub-scale, Graham, 2011). The MFSS, on the other hand, measures the “degree to which people ‘sacralize’ each of the five innate psychological foundations proposed by the MFT” (Vecina, 2014, p. 47; Graham & Haidt, 2011). In order to measure the ‘sacralizing’ (i.e. endorsement) of the foundations people are asked to indicate how much money somebody would have to pay them to commit a moral wrong, thereby asking them to take the “agent” or “perpetrator” perspective.

Based on the finding that people harbor dispositional perspective-specific sensitivities to moral concerns (e.g. Schmitt et al., 2005), we propose that how people reflect upon moral issues depends on the perspective they take. Therefore, in the present research, we combine the perspective-specific sensitivity represented in the justice sensitivity approach with content-specific moral foundations sensitivity in a new measure named the Moral Perspectives and Foundations Scale (MPFS). We seek to demonstrate its measurement

properties and its predictive validity with regard to political ideologies and people's opinions on political issues (specifically, immigration policies).

### **Moral Perspectives and Foundations Scale**

The Moral Perspectives and Foundations Scale (MPFS) captures the five moral domains as introduced by Graham and colleagues (2011) once for each of the four JS perspectives (Schmitt et al., 2005). With this measure, we apply the original version of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, which captures five moral foundations and contains 30 items – 6 items for each moral foundation – and reword them so that they reflect a particular perspective (i.e., victim, observer, beneficiary, perpetrator; see Schmitt et al., 2010). For instance, where the original moral foundation item measuring the relevance of the fairness domain reads “Whether or not someone acted unfairly” the victim-perspective version of this item is “Whether someone treated me unfairly”, the beneficiary-perspective version is “Whether I benefited from the fact that someone treated someone else unfairly”. This process involved adapting items from the original MFQ relevance subscale, mostly formulated from an observer perspective, to the other perspectives, as well as, unifying the different perspectives that are contained in the original MFQ judgement subscale to a single perspective and then adapting them to the other perspectives. Doing so results in a 120-item measure, the Moral Perspectives and Foundations Scale (MPFS, see Appendix A for the full set of items).

The names of the four perspective-specific Moral Foundations Sensitivity sub-scales are based on the perspectives used in the JS literature (e.g., “victim”, “observer”). However, it is important to note that the meaning of these perspectives differ in the context of this research compared to the JS literature. For instance, by naming an MPFS subscale “victim” subscale we do not mean to imply that harm be done (cf. Schein & Gray, 2015), but rather we refer to the perspective from which one experiences a moral transgression. In order to clarify

this meaning and to guide the perspective-specific adaptation of the MFQ-items, we formulated the following item-construction principles:

1. Victim-oriented moral foundations sensitivity means that “I am the subject to a domain-specific (harm, fairness, loyalty, ...) violation committed by someone else.” That is, on the relevance subscale I rate an item as highly relevant if the domain specific violation has negative consequences for me and on the judgment subscale I “agree strongly” to an item if the domain specific violation has negative consequences for me.
2. Observer-oriented moral foundations sensitivity means that “I witness a situation where somebody else is subject to a domain-specific (harm, fairness, loyalty, ...) violation by a third party.” That is, on the relevance subscale I rate an item as highly relevant if it bothers me to witness a domain specific violation by somebody that has no consequences for me, and potentially negative consequences for a third person; and on the judgment subscale I “agree strongly” to an item if a violation has no consequences for me, but the fact of witnessing a violation that another person potentially suffers from bothers me.
3. Beneficiary-oriented moral foundations sensitivity means that “I benefit from the fact that somebody else is subject to a domain-specific (harm, fairness, loyalty, ...) violation by a third party.” That is, on the relevance subscale I rate an item as highly relevant if it bothers me that a domain specific violation by somebody has beneficial consequences for me, and negative consequences for a third person; and on the judgment subscale I “agree strongly” to an item if a violation has beneficial consequences for me, and another person suffers negative consequences.
4. Perpetrator-oriented moral foundations sensitivity means that “I am the perpetrator of a domain-specific (harm, fairness, loyalty, ...) violation.” That is, on the relevance subscale I rate an item as highly relevant if it bothers me that I subjected somebody else to a domain specific violation that has negative consequences for that person; and on

the judgment subscale I “agree strongly” to an item if it bothers me that I subjected somebody else to a domain specific violation that has negative consequences for that person.

In this item-construction process, we allowed ourselves to deviate from the original wording of the MFQ-items in order to increase the degree of precision of MPFS items in discriminating between the five moral foundations. If necessary, we decided to focus MPFS items on specific aspects of the moral foundations ([www.moralfoundations.org](http://www.moralfoundations.org)), which are more easily adaptable to the four perspectives. Regarding the harm/care foundation, we focused on violations of the need principle, which is implied by the definition of harm/care as underlying “virtues of kindness, gentleness, and nurturance” and being triggered by “suffering, distress, or neediness expressed by one’s child (Graham et al., 2013; p. 68). With regard to the fairness/cheating foundation, we focused on violations of the equality and equity principle, which is in line with how this foundation is defined: “Fairness included concerns about equality, which are more strongly endorsed by political liberals. However, as we reformulated the theory in 2011 based on new data, we emphasize proportionality, which is endorsed by everyone, but is more strongly endorsed by conservatives” ([www.moralfoundations.org](http://www.moralfoundations.org)). Regarding the sanctity foundation, we focused on violations of “religious feelings” in line with the idea that the foundation underlies notions of an elevated and sacred life. Lastly, we partly reformulated items of the in-group/loyalty and authority/subversion foundations so that the violation becomes more apparent and a perspective-specific adaptation is possible. For instance, when an original MFQ item read, “I am proud of my country’s history” we included a violation of this in-group/loyalty foundation (i.e. speaking disrespectfully of our country’s history) which could then be adapted per perspective. Additionally, we ensured that the reference person in the items remain singular throughout all items.



Based on the theoretical explanation pertaining to the integration of perspectives and moral foundations and by use of the developed measurement tool we propose the following hypothesis:

#### *Hypothesis 1. Measurement Model*

H1. Systematically combining the five moral foundations with the four JS perspectives yields a 20-factor model that cannot be reduced to either a four-factor model (representing perspectives) nor a five-factor model (representing foundations) without loss of model fit.

#### **Predicting Political Ideologies and Opinions**

Previous research on MFT suggests that liberals endorse the “individualizing foundations” (i.e., care/harm and fairness/cheating) more strongly than the “binding foundations” (i.e., loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion and sanctity/degradation), whereas conservatives endorse all five moral foundations to an equal degree (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009). This finding has been reproduced in multiple countries (Di Battista, Pivetti, & Berti, 2018; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Yalçındağ et al., 2019). Other researchers have challenged these findings in arguing that differences between liberals and conservatives with regard to their moral intuitions reflect individual differences in authoritarianism and social dominance orientation rather than moral foundations (Kugler, Jost, & Noorbaloochi, 2014). Specifically, they suggest that conservatives’ stronger endorsement of ingroup, authority, and purity concerns can be attributed to higher levels of authoritarianism, whereas liberals’ greater valuation of fairness and harm avoidance is attributable to lower levels of social dominance orientation.

Research on justice sensitivity has just started to explore the relation between JS perspectives and political ideologies and opinions. For instance, Rothmund and colleagues (2020) found that victim sensitivity is positively related to populist attitudes, anti-immigration sentiments as well as preferences for populist radical right-wing actors, whereas the three “other-oriented” JS perspectives are negatively related with anti-immigration sentiments and

populist radical right-wing actors. Replicating these findings in a sample with German adolescents (13-18 years), Jahnke et al. (2020) showed that victim sensitivity was related to right-wing political attitudes, whereas the other-oriented JS perspectives were related to left-wing political attitudes. An explanation for these findings is that a right-wing or conservative ideology tends to emphasize self- (or in-group) oriented morality concerns (van Leeuwen & Park, 2009), which have been associated with victim sensitivity (Rothmund, Stavrova, & Schlösser, 2017), and that a left-wing ideology interprets morality in a less in-group focused but more other-oriented manner (Rothmund, Becker, & Jost, 2016), which is in line with correlational findings (Gollwitzer et al., 2005).

Here, we explore the relation between perspective- as well as content-specific moral sensitivity and political ideologies and attitudes in more detail. Based on findings indicating that self- or in-group oriented morality concerns are associated with a right-wing political orientation, whereas other-oriented morality concerns are related to left-wing political orientation (Jahnke et al., 2020; Rothmund et al., 2020), we hypothesize that a self-oriented moral foundation sensitivity positively predicts right-wing political orientation, preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations, and that an other-oriented moral foundation sensitivity positively predicts left-wing political orientation and negatively predicts preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations.

#### *Hypothesis II. Relation to Political Orientation, Political Party Preferences and Opinions*

H2a. A self-oriented moral foundation sensitivity positively predicts right-wing political orientation, preferences for populist right-wing parties, and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations – that is, the relation between perspective and political ideology is not moderated by moral foundations (neither by the five-factorial MF nor by the two factorial individualizing and binding MF).

H2b. An other-oriented moral foundation sensitivity positively predicts left-wing political orientation and negatively predicts preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations – that is, the relation between perspective and political ideology is not moderated by moral foundations (neither by the five-factorial MF nor by the two factorial individualizing and binding MF).

### **Implications for Future Research and Limitations**

In this study, we will systematically integrate two independent constructs reflecting individuals' disposition to think and feel about justice and morality-related issues: Justice Sensitivity (JS) and Moral Foundations (MF). On the basis of this initial investigation, future studies will increase the current understanding of variance in how people are disposed to think and feel about justice and morality-related issues. However, given the constitutive nature of this work, additional research will be needed to substantiate and expand the findings presented herein.

The generalizability of our findings will be limited. Data will be generated from a nonrepresentative sample from Germany. Future research will have to replicate the measurement with population representative, cross-cultural samples. As highlighted by Graham and colleagues (2011), cross-cultural differences in moral foundation scores were found. An investigation of cross-cultural differences in perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity as well as the associated affects and cognitions will be required.

Future studies investigating the content validity of this moral foundations sensitivity measure will need to test the construct's relation to further justice and moral sensitivity measures (Miller et al., 2014). Future investigations of its criterion-related validity will need to link this content- and perspective-specific measure to a selection of relevant outcomes associated with moral judgment, moral decision-making and moral behavior (Messik, 1995).

The original MFQ (Graham et al., 2011), the original Justice Sensitivity Scale (Schmitt et al., 2010) as well as the integrative content- and perspective-specific Moral Perspectives and

Foundation Scale (MPFS) used in this study are explicit self-report measures. This methodological strategy has been associated with several limitations, as the content- and perspective-specific sensitivities for moral domains may be rooted in automatic affects and attitudes, which are better captured with implicit measures (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). More work will be needed to test the convergent validity of this explicit content- and perspective-specific measure and future research could address the outlined limitation by also integrating implicit measures and investigating their theoretical and empirical relation (Greenwald et al., 1998; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & Stewart, 2005).

Finally, a practical application of these preliminary results may allow for more precise predictions of affective, cognitive and behavioral outcomes. Future research will need to investigate these preliminary insights and to integrate the findings in the current understanding of the role, individuals' moral foundation sensitivity plays. For instance, variance in a wide range of variables such as intentions to donate and donation behavior (Nilsson et al., 2016), decisions and behaviors in experimental public goods games (Schier et al., 2016), attitudes towards climate change (Dickinson et al., 2016) as well as leadership styles, leadership perceptions and behaviors (Egorov et al., 2019; Fehr et al., 2015; Weaver et al., 2014) has been explained by individuals' moral foundations. With regard to the research question of the current study, these established theoretical links of the construct and related outcomes may require further investigation. In particular, variance in these outcomes may be better explained by a content- and perspective-specific moral foundation sensitivity.

In this context, research on the link between moral foundations and political ideology as well as justice sensitivity and political ideology offer two illustrating examples. Both constructs have been linked to individuals' political ideology, but the question whether a perspective-specific approach represented in Justice Sensitivity, a content-specific approach represented in Moral Foundations, or an integrative moral domain sensitivity approach

introduced in our study best predicts political attitudes has remained unexplored so far and will be linked to significant implications for research and practice.

## **Materials and Methods**

### **Sampling Plan / Data collection / Data acquisition**

Data will be collected online according to ZPID procedures. The proposed study will be carried out online and in accordance with DGPs Ethical Guidelines<sup>1</sup> as well as other applicable rules and regulations (e.g. GDPR).

### **Sample size**

We plan to collect data from a sample of  $N = 2200$  individuals. A relatively large sample size is necessary to allow for intercorrelations between factors in SEM analyses and to be able to conduct our analyses with regards to several dependent variables. Intercorrelations are to be expected because moral foundations are based on an idea of weak modularity (Graham et al., 2012) and the justice sensitivity literature also highlights that even though different perspectives can be distinguished, they are positively correlated with each other (Schmitt et al., 2010). In the present study, we are unable to determine the necessary sample size based on statistical power because the effects specified in our hypotheses have never been tested before. In order to be able to replicate Rothmund et al.'s (2019) findings (as specified in H2), we aim for a sample size that is comparable to their study. Rothmund et al. (2019) used a combined sample of 1,500 respondents from the US and 848 respondents from Germany ( $N=2,348$ ), both via professional sampling agencies. Graham et al. (2009) used a sample of 1,613 respondents (Study 1) and 2,212 respondents (Study 2), both from the "Project Implicit" participant pool.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.dgps.de/index.php>

## **Participant characteristics**

Participants have to be 18 years or older and must be eligible to vote in Germany. The sampling follows a quota plan based on the distribution of gender and education levels of the German population (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2019):

Gender: ca. 50% female, ca. 50% male

Low education (no Abitur<sup>2</sup>): ca. 50% (N = 1100)

Medium education (Abitur): ca. 30% (N = 660)

High education (Academic degree): ca. 20% (N = 440)

## **Conditions and design**

The present study is based on a cross-sectional design that aims at predicting political orientation based on different models according to our hypotheses (see below) in structural equation modelling (SEM).

## **Variables**

All variables are measured via self-reports. The design includes no experimental manipulation. The unit of analysis is the individual. Measured variables are listed in the following (for full set of items, see Appendix A):

1. Moral Perspectives and Foundations Scale (MPFS; 120 items)
2. Voting behavior (“Sonntagsfrage”; Dimap, 2016, 1 item)
3. Anti-immigration attitudes (taken from Rothmund et al., 2019 and European Social Survey, 2019; 5 items)
4. Political self-identification (Graham et al., 2009, Studies 1+2; single-item)
5. Demographics: Age, Gender, Education, Religion

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<sup>2</sup> German high school diploma

## **Analysis Plan**

### **I. Measurement Model**


For more convenient reading we repeat hypothesis 1 here:

H1. Systematically combining the five moral foundations with the four JS perspectives yields a 20-factor model that cannot be reduced to either a four-factor model (representing perspectives) nor a five-factor model (representing foundations) without loss of model fit.

#### **Analysis**

Conventional fit indices ( $\chi^2$  statistic, CFI, RMSEA, BIC) for four different measurement (i.e., CFA) models will be directly or indirectly compared against each other:

- a) One-factor model (all 120 items loading on a single factor)
- b) Four-factor sensitivity model (factor loadings for items indicating the same sensitivity perspective – i.e., victim, observer, beneficiary, or perpetrator – are restricted to be equal across all five moral foundations)
- c) Five-factor foundations model (factor loadings for items indicating the same moral foundation are restricted to be equal across all four sensitivity perspectives)
- d) 20-factor MPFS model (each item loads on one specific moral sensitivity – that is, a sensitivity perspective x moral foundation combination – but no restrictions are imposed on factor loadings). In addition, nine second-order factors – four sensitivity perspective factors and five moral foundation factors – as well as three third-order factors – other-oriented sensitivity perspectives, individualizing foundations, binding foundations – are specified (see Figure 1).



Our hypothesis implies that the model fit for Model (d) is significantly better than the fit of models (a), (b), and (c).

## II. Relation to Political Party Preferences and Political Opinions

For more convenient reading we repeat hypotheses 2a and 2b here:

H2a. A self-oriented moral foundation sensitivity positively predicts preferences for right-wing political orientation, populist right-wing parties, and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations – that is, the relation between perspective and political ideology is not moderated by moral foundations (neither by the five-factorial MF nor by the two factorial individualizing and binding MF).

H2b. An other-oriented moral foundation sensitivity positively predicts left-wing political orientation and negatively predicts preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes across all five moral foundations – that is, the relation between perspective and political ideology is not moderated by moral foundations (neither by the five-factorial MF nor by the two factorial individualizing and binding MF).



## Analysis

To test H2a, we specify a path model (SEM) in which the five moral sensitivities from a self-oriented (i.e., victim) perspective (i.e., one for each moral foundation) predict right-wing political orientation, preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes. We will test two restricted models: (1) path coefficients are restricted to be equal for all five moral foundations and (2) path coefficients are restricted to be equal for individualizing and binding foundations against (3) an unrestricted model (i.e., path coefficients are estimated freely) and compare the fit of these three models directly against each other. We hypothesize that the unrestricted model does *not* fit better to the data than the restricted models.

To test H2b, we specify a path model (SEM) in which the five moral sensitivities (i.e., one for each moral foundation) from the observer, the beneficiary, and the perpetrator perspectives, respectively positively predict left-wing political orientation and negatively predict preferences for populist right-wing parties and anti-immigration attitudes. We will test two restricted models: (1) path coefficients are restricted to be equal for all five moral foundations and (2) path coefficients are restricted to be equal for individualizing and binding foundations against (3) an unrestricted model (i.e., path coefficients are estimated freely) and compare the fit of these three models directly against each other. We hypothesize that the unrestricted model does *not* fit better to the data than the restricted models.

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