

Competition for novelty in an information-sampling game

Leonid Tiokhin, Maxime Derex

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Trier, Germany

American
SOCIOLOGICAL
Review

Official Journal of the American Sociological Society

PRIORITIES IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY:
A CHAPTER IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE *

ROBERT K. MERTON
Columbia University

“In biology, it is the long-standing practice to append the name of the first describer to the name of a species, a custom which greatly agitated Darwin since, as he saw it, this put “a premium on hasty and careless work” as the “species mongers” among naturalists try to achieve an easy immortality by “miserably describing a species in two or three lines.”

(Merton, 1957, p. 644)

“Scientific research can be a cutthroat business, with undue pressure to publish quickly, first, and frequently. The resulting race to publish ahead of competitors is intense and to the detriment of the scientific endeavor...we are formalizing a policy whereby manuscripts that confirm or extend a recently published study (“scooped” manuscripts, also referred to as complementary) are eligible for consideration at PLOS Biology.”

(The PLOS Biology Staff Editors, 2018)



EDITORIAL

SCIENTIFIC PUBLISHING

Beyond scoops to best practices

Authors submitting a manuscript to eLife are encouraged to upload it to a recognized preprint server at the same time in order to make their results available as quickly and as widely as possible.

[EVE MARDER](#)



EDITORIAL

The importance of being second

The *PLOS Biology* Staff Editors*

Public Library of Science, San Francisco, California, United States of America

* plosbiology@plos.org

Registered Report:
Competition for novelty in an
information-sampling game.

*Royal Society Open Science
(Stage 2 Review).*



Experimental Design

Confirmatory Hypotheses

Criteria for Evaluating Evidence for/against Hypotheses

Inclusion / Exclusion Criteria

Theoretical Model

Statistical Models

Pilot Study + Quality Checks


Data-Collection Stopping Rules

Power Analysis




Puzzle

Score 0




Which color is the most common?






Large Effect



Medium Effect




Small Effect


260 students from Arizona State University (130 M / 130 F).

85 - 99% Statistical Power to detect effects.

Participants fully informed of payoff structure and told that their earnings depend on their performance.

Tile-sequences deterministic.





Experiment lasts 20 minutes.


Players can reveal 1 tile every 1 second.

+1 for correct guesses.

-1 for incorrect guesses.

Puzzle

Score 1




Which color is the most common?



Puzzle

Score 1



Which color is the most common?




Correct! You gained 1 point.

Please wait for the next problem

▪


Puzzle

Score 2



Which color is the most common?





Experiment lasts as long as it takes players to complete the same grids as their opponent.

Players can reveal 1 tile every 1 second.


+1 for correct guesses.

-1 for incorrect guesses.

0 points when scooped.

Puzzle

Score 1




Which color is the most common?



Puzzle

Score 1



Which color is the most common?




Correct. However your competitor already solved the problem, so you did not gain any points.

Please wait for the next problem

▪

Puzzle

Score 1




Which color is the most common?





Hypothesis 1:

Competition will cause players to guess with less information and be less accurate




$\beta = -3.70$
95% HPDI: (-5.03, -2.39)



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95% HPDI: (-5.03, -2.39)


$\beta = -0.07$
95% HPDI: (-0.11, -0.03)

What if players can potentially improve research efficiency by increasing effort?



Puzzle

Score 0



Solve this math problem to unlock the grid

$1 + 3 + 1$


OK

Which color is the most common?



Puzzle

Score 0




Problem solved! Click on a tile.

Which color is the most common?



Puzzle

Score 0



Solve this math problem to unlock the grid

$$4 + 1 + 7$$

OK

Which color is the most common?



Hypothesis 2:


When players can potentially increase research efficiency by adjusting effort (i.e. arithmetic-problem solving speed), competition will cause players to increase effort.

Hypothesis 2:

When players can potentially increase research efficiency by adjusting effort (i.e. arithmetic-problem solving speed), competition will cause players to increase effort.

Hypothesis 3:

Competition x Effort Interaction: competition will have smaller effects on tiles revealed in the Effort conditions compared to the No-Effort conditions.



$$\beta = -0.02$$

95% HPDI: (-0.40, 0.35)

Model Comparison: Arithmetic Problems

EFFORT: TIME TO ACCURATELY SOLVE AN ARITHMETIC PROBLEM


	WAIC	dWAIC	weight	SE
Effort_C	78912.99	0.0	0.6	506.26
Effort_Intercept_Only	78913.79	0.8	0.4	506.25

Bayes Factors: Comp vs. No Comp

BIC Max N (20098 Observations) BF01 = 142

BIC Min N (130 Observations) BF01 = 11






NE Comp. $\beta = -3.70$
95% HPDI: (-5.03, -2.39)

E Comp $\beta = -3.11$
95% HPDI: (-4.47, -1.86)

Comp X E Interaction $\beta = 0.60$
95% HPDI: (-1.23, 2.54)



NE Comp. $\beta = -0.07$
 95% HPDI: (-0.11, -0.03)

E Comp $\beta = -0.07$
 95% HPDI: (-0.11, -0.02)

Comp X E Interaction $\beta = 0.01$
 95% HPDI: (-0.07, 0.10)

Model Comparison: Tiles Revealed

TILES REVEALED

	WAIC	dWAIC	weight	SE
Tiles_E_C	69826.83	0.00	0.55	331.09
Tiles_C	69828.53	1.69	0.24	331.20
Tiles_E_C_EC	69828.74	1.91	0.21	331.06

Bayes Factors: Interaction vs. No Interaction

BIC Max N (14073 Observations) BF01 = 119

BIC Min N (260 Observations) BF01 = 16



Model Comparison: Accuracy

ACCURACY

	WAIC	dWAIC	weight	SE
Accuracy_C	14646.12	0.00	0.49	114.96
Accuracy_E_C	14647.03	0.91	0.31	114.98
Tiles_E_C_EC	14647.89	1.77	0.20	115.02

Bayes Factors: Interaction vs. No Interaction

BIC Max N (14073 Observations) BF01 = 119


BIC Min N (260 Observations) BF01 = 16




Takeaways:

Competition for novel results causes players to make guesses using less information and have reduced accuracy.


When players can potentially beat competitors by increasing effort, players do not increase effort but still reduce sample size*.



Large Effect




Medium Effect




Small Effect




Tiles revealed as a function of effect size



Accuracy as a function of effect size




Sensitivity Checks



Limitations

- Lacks multi-sided strategic interaction.
 - Effort null-effect generalizable?
 - Models science as gathering information on independent, well-defined problems.





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Cognition

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/COGNIT



Rivals in the dark: How competition influences search in decisions under uncertainty

Nathaniel D. Phillips^{a,*}, Ralph Hertwig^a, Yaakov Kareev^b, Judith Avrahami^b


^a Max Planck Institute for Human Development, Berlin, Germany

^b The Center for the Study of Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel



Affordances and Inferences

- Proof of concept that rewarding novelty can incentivize people to acquire less information on research problems.
- Simple paradigm that can be used to test Metascientific hypotheses.



“Interventions to change the current system should not be accepted without proper scrutiny, even when they are reasonable and well intended.”

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Essay

How to Make More Published Research True

John P. A. Ioannidis^{1,2,3,4*}

Thank You.



Where innovation starts



Contact

LeoTiokhin.com

LeoTiokhin@gmail.com



@LeonidTiokhin

Data, materials, code, and pre-registrations

All: <https://osf.io/u97k3/>

Code: <https://github.com/ltiokhin>

Registered Report: <https://osf.io/tn2vu/>

Thank You.



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
Code: <https://github.com/ltiokhin>

Registered Report: <https://osf.io/tn2vu/>



<p>Time: 20 minutes</p> <p>Points: +1, -1</p> <p>Tiles: 1 second</p>	<p>Time: As long as necessary</p> <p>Points: +1, -1 (if not scooped)</p> <p>Tiles: 1 second</p>
<p>Time: 20 minutes</p> <p>Points: +1, -1</p> <p>Tiles: depends on effort</p>	<p>Time: As long as necessary</p> <p>Points: +1, -1 (if not scooped)</p> <p>Tiles: depends on effort</p>

Expected Tiles Revealed: Competition



BIC Approximation: Bayes Factors (Wagenmakers, 2007)

tion: $\Pr_{\text{BIC}}(D | H_i) = \exp[-\text{BIC}(H_i)/2]$. In the case of two models, H_0 and H_1 , the Bayes factor is defined as the ratio of the prior predictive probabilities; hence, the BIC approximation of the Bayes factor is given by

$$BF_{01} \approx \frac{\Pr_{\text{BIC}}(D | H_0)}{\Pr_{\text{BIC}}(D | H_1)} = \exp(\Delta\text{BIC}_{10}/2), \quad (10)$$

where $\Delta\text{BIC}_{10} = \text{BIC}(H_1) - \text{BIC}(H_0)$. For instance, if

Models used for Bayes Factors

Time to accurately solve one arithmetic problem

Model 0: lmer(ElapsedTime_MathSolved ~ n_major.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.math.agg.f, REML=FALSE)

Model 1: lmer(ElapsedTime_MathSolved ~ Competition + n_major.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.math.agg.f, REML=FALSE)

Max N = 20098 observations. Min N = 130 observations.

BIC Max N. $BF_{01} = 142$

BIC Min N. $BF_{01} = 11$

Model 0: lmer(ElapsedTime_MathSolved ~ Sex + n_major.s + Guess_Number.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.math.agg.f, REML=FALSE)

Model 1: lmer(ElapsedTime_MathSolved ~ Sex + Competition + n_major.s + Guess_Number.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.math.agg.f, REML=FALSE)

Max N = 20098 observations. Min N = 130 observations.

BIC Max N. $BF_{01} = 142$

BIC Min N. $BF_{01} = 11$

Models used for Bayes Factors

Tiles revealed

Model 0: lmer(TilesRevealed ~ Competition + n_major.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.math.agg.f, REML=FALSE)

*Model 1: lmer(TilesRevealed ~ Competition*Effort + n_major.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.conf.agg.f, REML=FALSE)*

Max N = 14073 observations. Min N = 260 observations.

BIC Max N. BF₀₁ = 44

BIC Min N. BF₀₁ = 6

*Model 0: lmer(TilesRevealed ~ Sex*Effort + Competition + Effort + n_major.s + Guess_Number.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.conf.agg.f, REML=FALSE)*

*Model 1: lmer(TilesRevealed ~ Sex*Effort + Competition*Effort + n_major.s + Guess_Number.s + (1|ID_Player), data = d.conf.agg.f, REML=FALSE)*

Max N = 14073 observations. Min N = 260 observations.

BIC Max N. BF₀₁ = 118

BIC Min N. BF₀₁ = 16

Models used for Bayes Factors

Accuracy

Model 0: $glmer(\text{Correct_Guess} \sim \text{Competition} + \text{Effort} + \text{n_major.s} + (1|ID_Player), \text{data} = \text{d.conf.agg.f}, \text{family} = \text{binomial})$

*Model 1: $glmer(\text{Correct_Guess} \sim \text{Competition} * \text{Effort} + \text{n_major.s} + (1|ID_Player), \text{data} = \text{d.conf.agg.f}, \text{family} = \text{binomial})$*

Max N = 14073 observations. Min N = 260 observations.

BIC Max N. $BF_{01} = 118$

BIC Min N. $BF_{01} = 16$

*Model 0: $glmer(\text{Correct_Guess} \sim \text{Sex} * \text{Effort} + \text{Competition} + \text{Effort} + \text{n_major.s} + \text{Guess_Number.s} + (1|ID_Player), \text{data} = \text{d.conf.agg.f}, \text{family} = \text{binomial})$*

*Model 1: $glmer(\text{Correct_Guess} \sim \text{Sex} * \text{Effort} + \text{Competition} * \text{Effort} + \text{n_major.s} + \text{Guess_Number.s} + (1|ID_Player), \text{data} = \text{d.conf.agg.f}, \text{family} = \text{binomial})$*

Max N = 14073 observations. Min N = 260 observations.

BIC Max N. $BF_{01} = 118$

BIC Min N. $BF_{01} = 16$

Bayesian Models used in RR

Model 1: To compare the number of tiles that players reveal before guessing the majority color in the Competition treatments versus the No-Competition treatments, we will use a multiple linear regression, with random effects for player, of the following form:

$$Y_i \sim \text{Normal}(\mu_i, \sigma)$$

$$\mu_i = \alpha + \alpha_{\text{PLAYER}[i]} + \beta_C * C_i + \beta_E * E_i + \beta_{CE} * C_i * E_i + \beta_{Ns} * N_{Si}$$

Y_i : Number of tiles clicked before guessing. α : Intercept. $\alpha_{\text{PLAYER}[i]}$: Random intercept for each player. C : Competition Treatment (1 / 0). E : Effort Condition (1 / 0). $\beta_{CE} * C_i * E_i$: Interaction between treatment and effort. β_{Ns} : Standardized number of tiles for the majority color (i.e. effect size).

Bayesian Models used in RR

Model 2: To assess the probability of a correct guess, we will use a logistic regression, with random effects for player, of the following form:

$$S_i \sim \text{Binomial}(1, p_i)$$

$$\text{Logit}(p_i) = \alpha + \alpha_{\text{PLAYER}[i]} + \beta_C * C_i + \beta_E * E_i + \beta_{CE} * C_i E_i + \beta_{Ns} * N_{s_i}$$

S_i : Successful guess. α : Intercept. $\alpha_{\text{PLAYER}[i]}$: Random intercept for each player. C : Competition Treatment (1 / 0). E : Effort Condition (1 / 0). $\beta_{CE} * C_i E_i$: Interaction between treatment and effort. β_{Ns} : Standardized number of tiles for the majority color (i.e. effect size).

Bayesian Models used in RR

Model 3: To test the effect of competition on the time between clicking one tile and being allowed to click the subsequent tile (i.e. time to accurately solve one arithmetic problem), we will use a multiple linear regression, with random effects for player, of the following form:

$$Y_i \sim \text{Normal}(\mu_i, \sigma)$$

$$\mu_i = \alpha + \alpha_{\text{PLAYER}[i]} + \beta_C * C_i + \beta_{Ns} * Ns_i$$

Y_i : Time between clicking one tile and being allowed to click the subsequent tile (i.e. time to solve an arithmetic problem; seconds). α : Intercept. $\alpha_{\text{PLAYER}[i]}$: Random intercept for each player. C : Competition Treatment (1 / 0). β_{Ns} : Standardized number of tiles for the majority color (i.e. effect size).

Priors for Bayesian Models used in RR

551

552 Priors.

553

Parameter	Effort Manipulation Check	Competition Attention Check	Model 1 (Tiles)	Model 2 (Correct Guess)	Model 3 (Arithmetic Time)
σ	Gamma (2, 0.5)	NA	Gamma (2, 0.5)	NA	Gamma (2, 0.5)
α	Gamma (1.5, 0.05)	Normal (0, 10)	Uniform (0, 25)	Normal (0, 10)	Gamma (1, 0.05)
α_{PLAYER}	Normal (0, σ_{PLAYER})	NA	Normal (0, σ_{PLAYER})	Normal (0, σ_{PLAYER})	Normal (0, σ_{PLAYER})
σ_{PLAYER}	Gamma (1.5, 0.05)	NA	Gamma (1.5, 0.05)	Gamma (1.5, 0.05)	Gamma (1, 0.05)
β_C	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)
β_E	Normal (0, 10)	NA	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)	NA
β_{CE}	Normal (0, 10)	NA	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)	NA
β_{Ns}	NA	NA	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)	Normal (0, 10)


554

ROPES for Bayesian Models used in RR

Parameter	Effort Manipulation Check	Competition Attention Check	Model 1 (Tiles)	Model 2 (Correct Guess)	Model 3 (Arithmetic Time)
B_C	NA	(-0.8, 0.8)	(-1.22, 1.22)	(-0.19, 0.19)	(-0.33, 0.33)**
β_E	(-0.5, 0.5)	NA	NA	NA	NA
β_{CE}	NA	NA	(-0.10, 0.10)*	(-0.09, 0.09)	NA

Table 2 | Region of practical equivalence (ROPE) for quality checks and confirmatory analyses. ROPES for quality checks are based on subjective assessment of what effect size would convincingly indicate a successful manipulation. ROPES for confirmatory analyses (Models 1 - 3) are based on 95% statistical power, unless indicated otherwise. Model 1 tests the effect of the Competition treatment and Effort condition on number of tiles clicked before guessing, using a multiple linear regression with random effects for each player. Model 2 tests the effect of the Competition treatment and Effort condition on the probability of a correct guess, using a logistic regression with random effects for each player. Model 3 tests the effect of the Competition treatment on the time to accurately solve one arithmetic problem, using a multiple linear regression with random effects for each player. *ROPE based on 85% statistical power. **ROPE based on 99% statistical power.

Reward




WAIC: Reward Model Comparison

REWARD PER SECOND

	WAIC	pWAIC	dWAIC	weight
Reward_E	-2670.59	3.51	0.00	0.72
Reward_E_C	-2667.98	4.93	2.61	0.19
Reward_E_C_EC	-2666.40	5.76	4.19	0.09

Time to reveal 1 tile




WAIC: Time 1 Tile Model Comparison


TIME TO REVEAL 1 TILE

	WAIC	pWAIC	dWAIC	weight
Time_Tile_E	192698.0	475.96	0.00	0.40
Time_Tile_E_C_EC	192698.1	476.12	0.10	0.38
Time_Tile_E_C	192699.2	476.88	1.21	0.22


Tiles Revealed



Accuracy: Log Odds of Correct Guess




Time (seconds) to Accurately Solve One Arithmetic Problem




Expected Tiles Revealed: No Competition


Small Effect. Threshold = 100%



Medium Effect. Threshold = 82%




Large Effect. Threshold = 75%





All Effects. Optimal Opponent = 82%




Experiment
Simulation







Optimal: 100%



Optimal: 82%



Optimal: 75%







80% confident Bayesian
compared to competition
data




Small Effect






Medium Effect




Large Effect






Tiles revealed by 85% Bayesian across effect sizes



All Effects. 85% Threshold Bayesian




85% Bayesian compared to experimental data






Expected Tiles Revealed

Mean Tiles Revealed. 3 Effects.




Payoff to Simulated Bayesian


Small Effect, 10k Repeats.




Medium Effect, 10k Repeats.



Large Effect, 10k Repeats.







Payoff to Simulated Bayesian (All Effects)







Payoff to Simulated Bayesian in Competition

SD = 0




SD = 0.05

Payoff to Simulated Bayesian in Competition




Why payoff jumps around 75%


Medium Effect. Guessing with 74% Confidence. Mean = 1



Medium Effect. Guessing with 75% Confidence. Mean = 3.84




No ESS w/ Fixed Strategies




No ESS w/ Fixed Strategies


Equilibrium Distribution Types; 300gens; repeat # 20



Equilibrium Distribution Types; 300gens; repeat # 18



Equilibrium Distribution Types; 300gens; repeat # 1



Mixed Strategy ESS

20runs, 500gens, 0.003mutation, normalfitness

